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Abstract
The fair innings argument (FIA) is frequently put forward as a justification for denying elderly
patients treatment when they are in competition with younger patients and resources are scarce.
In this paper I will examine some arguments that are used to support the FIA. My conclusion will
be that they do not stand up to scrutiny and therefore, the FIA should not be used to justify the
denial of treatment to elderly patients, or to support rationing of health care by age.
There are six issues arising out of the FIA which are to be addressed. First, the implication that
there is such a thing as a fair share of life. Second, whether it makes sense to talk of a fair share of
resources in the context of health care and the FIA. Third, that 'fairness' is usually only mentioned
with regard to the length of a person's life, and not to any other aspect of it. Fourth, if it is sensible
to disc us s the  me rits  of t he  FIA wit hout t ak ing acc ount of t he 'all othe r t hings be ing e qual'
argument. Fifth, the difference between what is unfair and what is unfortunate. Finally, that it is
tragic if a young person dies, but only unfortunate if an elderly person does.
Discussion
At first sight the FIA is attractive. Appeals to fairness and
intuition appear to support the idea that finite resources
should be directed at the young, who have not had a
chance to live their lives, in preference to elderly people,
who have already lived a major part of theirs. However, I
will attempt to show why the arguments supporting the
FIA do not stand up to scrutiny.
A description of the FIA
John Harris describes the FIA as follows: 'The fair in-
nings argument takes the view that there is some span of
years that we consider a reasonable life [for a person to
have had], a fair innings. Let's say that a fair share of life
is the traditional three score and ten, seventy years. An-
yone who does not reach 70 suffers, on this view, the in-
justice of being cut off in their prime. They have missed
out on a reasonable share of life: they have been short-
changed. Those, however, who do make 70 suffer no such
injustice, they have not lost out but rather must consider
any additional years a sort of bonus beyond that which
could reasonably be hoped for. The fair innings argu-
ment requires that everyone be given an equal chance to
have a fair innings, to reach the appropriate threshold
but, having reached it, they have received their entitle-
ment' [1]. Harris, later in the same chapter writes, '... I
am inclined to believe that where two individuals both
equally wish to go on living for as long as possible our
duty to respect this wish is paramount. ... Each person's
desire to stay alive should be regarded as of the same im-
portance and as deserving the same respect as that of an-
yone else, irrespective of the quality of their life or its
expected duration. This would hold good in all cases in
which we have to choose between lives, except one. And
that is where one individual has had a fair innings and
the other not. In this case, although there is nothing to
chose between the two candidates from the points of
view of their respective will to live and both would suffer
the injustice of having their life cut short when it might
continue, only one would suffer the further injustice of
being deprived of a fair innings - a benefit the other has
received ... The fair innings argument points to the fact
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that the injustice done to someone who has not had a fair
innings when they lose out to someone who has is signif-
icantly greater than in the reverse circumstances. It is for
this reason that in the hopefully rare circumstances
where we have to choose between candidates who differ
only in this respect we should choose to give as many as
possible the chance of a fair innings' [1]. (I have quoted
Harris in full here for two reasons. First it is a good and
full description of the FIA. Second, so I cannot be ac-
cused of misrepresenting the FIA.)
There are, it seems to me, six issues that are either raised
directly by, or arise out of, Harris's description of the FIA
that need to be addressed. First, the implication that
there is such a thing as a fair share of life. Second, wheth-
er it makes sense to talk of a fair share of resources in the
context of the FIA. Third, that 'fairness' appears only to
be mentioned with regard to the length of a person's life,
and not to any other aspect of it. Fourth, whether we can
sensibly discuss the merits of the FIA without taking ac-
count of the 'all other things being equal' argument.
Fifth, the difference between what is unfair and what is
unfortunate. Finally, the idea that it is tragic if a young
person dies, but only unfortunate if an elderly person
does. I will deal with each of these in turn.
What is meant by a fair share of life?
As noted, Harris refers to 'a fair share of life'. He writes,
'Let's say a fair share of life is 70' [1]. But what is meant
by this? It may be helpful when discussing 'fair shares' to
think in terms of a cake that is to be divided, as it forces
us to ask three important questions. They are: 'what is
being shared?', 'who is it being shared between?' and,
'are people entitled to a share of it?' In taking this simple
example of a cake, we can by contrast see why talking of
a fair share of life (or a fair share of a life) does not in fact
make sense. Whilst we may well know the size of a cake
to be shared, we do not know the length of a life (until it
is over). Second, whereas a cake is divisible - a life is not.
Third, having a share of something implies that (a) we
can trade it (There are ways that we can almost trade our
lives. For instance, if a person was to sell a vital organ to
clear a debt. Although is at present illegal (in the UK) for
a person to do so, there has been a call to allow the sale
of kidneys [2]) (b) we can give our share of it away and
(c) we can decline it. As regards the first point, we obvi-
ously cannot trade life. With regard to (b), it seems
strange to think of years of life as something that can be
given way. As a parallel example, we can give away our
piece (or share) of a cake. However, we cannot give to an-
other person say five years of our life. As for (c), all that
we can do is refuse treatment in the hope that someone
else may benefit from the resources we have refused, but
of course there is no guarantee that they will be able to do
so. It is unlikely in any case that we would be permitted
to designate to whom the resource that we are refusing
should be given. We are unable therefore to give them
more shares of life. (Although we can stipulate that we
would only allow an organ to be removed from our body
in order to give it to one of our children, it is doubtful if
we could refuse a bed in hospital or a place on a dialysis
machine, on the understanding that it was given instead
to a person of our choice.) We certainly cannot give them
a share of our life. All the above points suggest that it
does not really make sense to talk of having a fair share
of life.
Inherent in the FIA is the notion that it is unfair when a
younger and an older patient are in competition for a re-
source, to prefer the latter, as he has already had more
time alive than the younger patient. I accept that the
analogy of the cake cannot take the question of time alive
into consideration. However, that it is necessarily unfair
to prefer the older patient in such a situation can be chal-
lenged and I will indeed do so when the 'all other things
being equal argument' is looked at shortly.
Does it make sense to talk of a fair share of resources in 
the context of a fair innings?
Daniel Callahan believes that it makes sense to talk of
elderly people having had their fair share of resources.
He writes, '... beyond a certain point that [elderly people]
will have already had their fair share of resources' [3].
But it will be recalled that there were three criteria that
needed to be established before we could meaningfully
answer the question when we asked 'what is meant by a
fair share of life?' Similarly, before deciding if it makes
sense to talk of a fair share of resources, we need to know
the amount or size of what is being shared, the numbers
of those among whom it is being shared among, and
whether the claimants have any entitlement to it. It
might, at first sight, be thought that in the case of the
NHS we do know the amount of what is to be shared. It
is the sum that government allocates to it. But this
amount is subject to continuous change, determined by
the government's spending priorities, subject to fluctua-
tion at the will of the legislature and often influenced by
both public opinion and the media.
Furthermore, if one attempts to establish the nature of
health care resources, it soon becomes clear that it is vir-
tually impossible to quantify them. For instance, should
nurses' overtime be counted as a resource, or only their
contracted hours? Should a hospital building be regard-
ed as a resource if it is mortgaged? Should the time a doc-
tor spends training to be a consultant be considered as a
resource for those people who are currently patients (but
who might die before he completes his training) or only
for future patients?BMC Medical Ethics (2000) 1:1 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/1/1
Even if we did know the extent of the resources available,
we do not know the numbers of those whom between it is
to be shared. Although we may be aware of the country's
total population, there may in fact be 'others' to be legit-
imately considered as well. For example, when thinking
of fair shares, should we not save some of the available
resources for people who do not yet exist? There are
many instances where actions are taken intended to ben-
efit those not yet born, and not just - perhaps not even
primarily - those who are currently alive. It is reasonable
to suppose that much of current medical research will be
of more value to future generations than to those who are
living now. It seems that we are therefore prepared to al-
locate some of our resources (that could be spent on peo-
ple living today) to the well being of those in the future.
However, even if we restrict our attention to current us-
ers of health care, we do not know how many of them will
require treating, nor do we know how much treatment
they will need. It can now be seen where all this is lead-
ing. If we cannot decide what a fair share is, how is it pos-
sible to decide on our fair share? Therefore, talk of
elderly people having more of their fair share or younger
people less, makes no sense when discussing the FIA.
Fairness
I have tried to establish that is it is not sensible to talk of
fair shares in the context of the FIA (or indeed in the al-
location of scarce health care resources). But that does
not mean that I cannot show that age-based rationing
(ABR) (when ABR is mentioned or alluded to in this pa-
per it will be on the basis that elderly people are denied
access to treatment that could benefit them solely, prin-
cipally, or partly because of their chronological age, and
to which younger patients are not denied access) of
health care is unfair, or that we cannot agree on what un-
fairness (in many situations) is. John Stuart Mill writes,
'... for justice, like many other moral attributes, is best
defined by its opposite' [4]. Although the notion of fair-
ness is vague it is possible to distinguish between various
kinds of unfairness. Unfairness for instance is not con-
fined to distributive justice. As an example, a kind of un-
fairness that makes sense to us is cheating - which need
not be taking more than one's share: it may be a matter
of departing from agreed rules. If you and I have decided
to play a game in which it is agreed that we can field
teams of 11 players, and I sneak an extra player on to the
pitch with the aim of gaining an advantage, I would be
acting unfairly. The issue of 'fair shares' simply does not
arise. If a policeman plants drugs on an innocent person
with a view to gaining a conviction he is acting unfairly.
Again, fair shares is not an issue here.
A major problem with the FIA is that discussion of fair-
ness is limited to length of life. Professor Alan Maynard
writes, 'The efficient use of scarce healthcare resources
might not be the only objective of society. Society might
be prepared to forego efficient health gains in order to
behave 'fairly' ... One possible definition of 'fairness' in
health care is that decision makers will use the NHS to
reduce inequalities in people's lifetime experience of
health. Such an approach reflects the idea of a 'fair in-
nings' and could support the transfer of health gains
from elderly people - who have had their 'three score
years and ten (or, hopefully more) - to younger people.
Thus the NHS might deny efficient treatments - such as
hip replacements or coronary artery bypass grafting - to
those who have had a fair innings in order to redistribute
resources and inefficiently treat young, chronically ill pa-
tients' [5]. (Why would treating chronically ill patients be
unfair?)
I accept that fairness is a difficult concept to define, but
why has Maynard chosen to use only 'a fair innings' - age
as expression of what is fair in the context of the alloca-
tion of scarce health care resources? For instance, it
might be considered unfair that a young drunken driver
who has injured himself through reckless behaviour is
preferred for treatment over an elderly person who is not
to blame for his illness. A consultant in an accident and
emergency department remarked to a friend that he was
fed up with patients having to wait hours for treatment as
a result of the department being full of young people who
had been badly hurt due to their heavy drinking. Or, why
would it be considered fair to prefer the younger person
in a situation where there are two claimants for treat-
ment, one aged 25 and the other aged 75, the former al-
ready having received a large amount of health care
resources as a result of his anti-social behaviour and the
latter, due to living a responsible life style having not had
to call on the NHS, but at an advanced age needing the
hip replacement to which Maynard refers? In these ex-
amples my complaint is not that older people are not re-
ceiving their fair share, but that the younger people are
being preferred unfairly, i.e. just because they are young.
Before continuing, I want to look at the three ways ABR
can be implemented. They are:
1. By macro rationing. This is where there is a national
policy which states a particular drug or treatment should
not be given to a person just because they are old. I have
not come across such a policy. In fact all the political par-
ties are at pains to state that ABR should not be counte-
nanced.
2. By meso rationing. This occurs where a department
has a policy (which can be implicit or explicit -written or
unwritten) that states those over a particular age should
not be treated. There are many instances of this. For ex-
ample, several heart transplant units do not put anyone
over 60 on their waiting list and some stroke rehabilita-
tion units will not admit anyone over the age of 65.BMC Medical Ethics (2000) 1:1 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/1/1
3. By micro rationing. This is rationing at the bed side
and occurs when a GP for example refuses to refer an eld-
erly patient to a consultant on the basis that the doctor
feels the patient is too old, irrespective of the benefit the
patient might gain from a consultation and the fact the
patient would opt for it given the chance.
Why is it always unfair to deny elderly patients treatment
on a meso basis and sometimes on a micro one? With re-
gard to meso rationing, suppose that, because of the ex-
pense of administering justice on an individual basis, it
was decided that all 18-year olds accused of violent
crimes would be jailed without a trial on the basis that
statistics showed it was that age group that was were re-
sponsible for the majority of such crimes, would we not
feel outraged because of the unfairness involved? Why
then should we not feel that it is unfair that all elderly
people be disadvantaged just because some within that
group use up a large amount of resources, or might have
less years to live than others? If it is regarded as unfair to
deny individual 18-year olds justice, should it also not be
regarded as equally unfair to deny individual elderly peo-
ple health care without them being individually as-
sessed? Moreover deciding policies on the basis of a
group means that some people would be denied treat-
ment, even if, for relatively small expense, they could be
given many extra years, or an enhanced quality of life.
Furthermore, if it was considered fair to give treatment
to those with a greater life expectancy then does it not
follow that it is also fair to treat women in preference to
men and to treat those in the higher socio-economic
classes in preference to those in the lower, as the former
in both instances are known to live longer. None of these
things makes any real sense.
With regard to micro rationing, it would be unfair to
deny elderly patients health care if the doctor's decision
was based on pejorative attitudes towards elderly people.
For example, at a meeting of GPs which took place in
January 2000 the chairman asked how many of them
practised ageism, 30% signified that they did. When
questioned about why they did so, many of the GPs gave
the FIA as a reason. Others said that they would prefer
using their limited resources on younger patients.
Supporters of the FIA may reply that a patient's potential
years might not be the only thing being considered when
allocating treatment; that the potential life years of a
claimant should be a consideration but not the only one.
However, whether in fact age would be decisive depends
how ABR is implemented. If it was implemented on a
meso level, i.e. no patient over 65 was to be admitted to
an intensive care bed or a coronary care unit, then age
would here be decisive. And, as I have attempted to
show, denying elderly people health care on this basis is
actually unfair.
I accept it might appear that fairness dictates that a
younger person should be treated before an older one.
After all, the older person has already had more of some-
thing (life) than the younger person has. Rather than
give even more to someone old we should instead treat
the younger patient. Surely fairness is an issue here.
Though such a view is perfectly understandable, it seems
to me that fairness might only be an issue 'if all other
thing were equal' and as I will explain next, it will be my
submission that they cannot be.
The 'all other things being equal' argument
We can look at the 'all other things being equal' argument
in two different ways. First, as a practical proposition for
rationing health in which a patient's chronological age is
used as a tie-breaker in deciding which of two individuals
to treat. Or, secondly, as a thought experiment along the
lines, 'In a hypothetical situation in which all other
things than age were equal, would it then be permissible
to use age as a tie breaker?' As ABR is a daily part of life
in the NHS [6] and as the FIA and all other things being
equal argument are often used to justify ABR (see below)
it does seem reasonable to discuss the 'all other things
being equal' argument in the context of it being a practi-
cal method of deciding which patient to treat.
Professor Richard Lilford, in replying to an article in
which I attacked ABR [7] writes, '... what should our pol-
icy be if two people arrive in an emergency department
with the same prognosis for recovery and the only distin-
guishing feature is that one is 30 and one is 80. To whom
should we allocate the only remaining ventilator, inten-
sive care bed, artificial lung machine etc. ... So what
would Rivlin do with my two injured patients in the acci-
dent and emergency department: would he allocate the
scare resources to the younger person, or simply go back
to his department of philosophy and leave the doctor on
the spot to decide?' [8]. The implication is that, in such
cases as the one outlined here, it is reasonable to use age
as the deciding factor in whom to treat.
But there is a major flaw in Lilford's reasoning. His argu-
ment assumes that all other things can be equal. (It does
not seem unreasonable to assume that this is what Lil-
ford meant as he suggested that age should be used as a
tie-breaker ... 'if the only distinguishing feature was a
substantial difference in their ages.') However, they can-
not be and it is a misleading distraction to suggest that
they can. It is in fact not possible for two patients to have
an identical condition, bearing in mind the differences
between both of a medical and, just as importantly, a so-
cial kind, that might have a significant effect on the
health and prognosis of individuals. (One cannot getBMC Medical Ethics (2000) 1:1 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/1/1
round this by saying that it is enough that there be mate-
rial differences, as we would then have to decide what
constitutes 'material' in this context.) For instance, fac-
tors that vary greatly between patients include how well
they can communicate with their doctors, their ability to
follow the physician's instructions, how they respond to
treatment, and their lifestyle. All or any of these may
have an enormous effect on how an illness progresses
and might contribute positively or adversely to their
well-being. The social circumstances of two claimants
also cannot possibly be the same and this may effect the
treatment they receive. In view of the above, even if it
was accepted that age should be used as a tie-break, there
are not likely to be any ties.
The difference between what is unfair and what is unfortu-
nate
It is important to distinguish between what is unfair and
what is merely unfortunate, in the context of the FIA.
Simmons, discussing 'fairness' in the Encyclopaedia of
Ethics, writes, 'The standard context in which problems
of fairness arise is one involving social co-operation
aimed at a mutually beneficial end, though considera-
tions of fairness clearly arise as well in nonvoluntary ar-
rangements and ... in contexts which are only remotely
'distributive' - as when [a] ... debilitating handicap is
called unfair' [9].
There is a crucial misunderstanding in the last part of
what Simmons reports here, which requires addressing.
To suggest that a person with a debilitating congenital
handicap has been subject to 'an unfairness' presupposes
that everyone has a right to be born as perfect as every-
one else. Simmons seems not to be differentiating be-
tween 'unfortunate' and 'unfair'. Whereas it might be
said that it was unfortunate that a person did not win the
National Lottery, surely it could never plausibly be sug-
gested that it was unfair that he did not do so. Unfairness
only arises if some human agency brings it about.
Early in this paper we noted that, in his definition of the
FIA, John Harris writes of those who have missed out on
a reasonable share of life as being 'short-changed', and
that those 'who do make 70 suffer no injustice'. The in-
ference here is also that being short-changed is unfair
(they are not getting the change they are due) as is not
reaching the age of 70. (We should note here that Harris
writes, 'the injustice done to someone who has not had a
fair innings is significantly greater than in the reverse
circumstances'. Presumably then he accepts that there is
some injustice being done to the older person if he is de-
nied treatment in order that someone younger may ben-
efit.) It is worth noting that Harris refers to an 'injustice'
when a person does not achieve a fair innings [1]. But he
does not mention that it may just be 'unfortunate' that
they do not reach 70, and not unjust. Of course, Harris
might mean that the injustice lies in giving an older pa-
tient treatment in preference to a younger one. However,
before it can be said that it is unfair that a person has not
achieved a 'fair innings', it must be stated why it is un-
fair, and explained why it is simply not unfortunate. As
Nicholas Rescher writes in his book Luck, '... like it or
not, luck is an ineliminable part of the human condition
... [it is] for better or worse - a major factor in our lives'
[10]. He later writes, 'With matters of luck the whole idea
of fair/unfair simply does not apply, because fairness is
excluded in the nature of the case' [11]. If the FIA is to be
credible, it is important that it takes into account the dis-
tinction between what is unfair and what is unfortunate.
However, as I have attempted to show, the FIA does not
do this, and therefore the argument fails because it
trades on the assumption that what is unfortunate is au-
tomatically unfair.
Some of those who do not reach old age might just be un-
lucky, and it is not (as Harris for instance claims) that it
is unjust that they do not do so. But it may be asked, 'is
there not a duty of those who can prevent 'bad luck' to do
so'? My feeling is that if we have any duties at all in these
matters our primary duty would be to prevent an injus-
tice.
Harry Lesser writes in discussing the FIA, 'It could also
be argued that some of the elderly who have had hard
lives when young may have had much less of the enjoya-
ble part of their lives than some younger people, and
could claim in a real sense that they have not yet 'had
their fair innings' [12].
Tragic v. unfortunate
The idea that it is tragic if a person dies young but only
unfortunate when an older person dies may have intui-
tive appeal, but falls down when we consider our feelings
towards, say, the death of a 25 year old heroin pusher
and that of a 70-year old grandparent who is doted on by
his children and grand children. Would we here be so
ready to think of the young criminal's death as more trag-
ic than that of the grandparent? It is not certain that we
would; and if this is the case, then the 'tragic v. unfortu-
nate' argument collapses into a social debate about
which of two people deserves treatment, based on our
appraisal of their lifestyles.
Another example illustrates the point. Consider the situ-
ation in which two people have been killed in an automo-
bile accident, one a joyrider who had stolen a car, the
other a mother, teacher or nurse whom the joyrider had
crashed into. Would we find it more tragic that the driver
of the car was killed? It seems plausible that we would
not, even if we were told that he was the younger of the
victims. The point I am making is that it is not true that
we necessarily see the death of a young person as beingBMC Medical Ethics (2000) 1:1 http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/backmatter/1472-6939-
more tragic than that of an older one. What I am trying
to show here is that our views of what is tragic may
change as further facts are known. Similarly, with regard
to fairness. Our views of whether something is fair may
change when further things become apparent.
I accept that many people would regard the death of a
young person as being a greater tragedy than that of
someone who dies when they are old. This view is bound
up with the notion that a young person's death is a pre-
mature one. But surely, if an elderly person is denied
treatment and he dies as a result, then that person's
death is also premature, and should therefore also be re-
garded as being tragic. As Wicclair writes '... even if it is
the case generally that unprevantable death from natural
causes of people over seventy-five or eighty is properly
understood as 'an acceptable event', it does not follow
that it is generally acceptable to withhold life-extending
medical care from people over seventy-five or eighty. It
also does not follow that it is generally improper for peo-
ple over seventy-five or eighty to desire life-extending
care that would enable them to continue to pursue their
interests' [13]. Of course the death of a young person
might be regarded as being more tragic, but it seems odd
to suggest that whether a person receives medical treat-
ment should depend on how we compare the tragicness
of the situation of claimants for a resource, (and even if it
was, how could 'tragicness' could be qualified?).
Conclusion
Attempting to be fair is supposedly what the FIA is all
about. Having examined some of the reasons (given or
implied) that are used to justify using the FIA it seems to
me that they are not persuasive. Being fair does not, con-
trary to what supporters of the FIA claim, mean that we
should discriminate against elderly patients on the
grounds of fairness. This being the case, it seems to me
that there are no grounds for using age as a basis for ra-
tioning health care on the basis of the FIA. Proponents of
ABR must try and find better and different arguments for
their cause.
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